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Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing of Retirement Payouts
in Participating Life Annuities
Life is a short affair; we should try to make it smooth, and free from strife.
Euripides

1. Introduction
Life insurers are permitted to employ both accounting and actuarial techniques to smooth
surpluses earned in good years, in order to support benefit payouts to policyholders in bad years. To
this end, insurers have a long history of reporting asset values at historical costs rather than fair
market values in their financial statements, and assessing their liabilities using an actuarial rather
than an alternative approach. Yet such smoothing techniques have come under fire of late, in part
due to life insurers’ difficulties in the present low interest rate environment (Ng and Schism, 2010).
Additionally, smoothing has been criticized for being nontransparent, making it difficult for
shareholders, policyholders, and regulators to assess insurers’ financial status (Jorgensen 2004). In
fact, based on their study of a Danish pension saving product, Guillen, Jorgensen, and Nielsen (2006)
concluded that “smoothing is an illusion,” providing no value to policyholders. Their result,
however, was limited to a product that provided no payouts until maturity; that is, benefits depended
on the contract’s terminal value, but not on the particular return trajectory that led to this value.
This paper explores how these smoothing techniques affect financial contracts known as
lifetime payout annuities offered by life insurance companies and purchased by retirees to provide a
steady stream of lifetime income. The predominant form of these payout products is with-profit or
participating payout life annuities (PLAs), which provide retirees with a guaranteed benefit for life
along with variable non-guaranteed payments that depend on investment returns and mortality
experiences of the insurance pool (Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin 2013). Accordingly, the particular
return trajectory has immediate consequences for the benefit stream provided by the annuity. Such
products with variable payouts are one of the most rapidly growing financial products over the last
few decades: in 2012, these products held $1.64 trillion of assets under management in the U.S. and
sales accounted for $145 billion, or two-thirds of all annuity sales (IRI 2013). Our goal is to examine
how the smoothing techniques employed by actuaries and accountants shape the risk and return
profiles of PLA payout streams, as well as insurer profitability and solvency.
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Accounting smoothing in the insurance context values assets at historical cost rather than at
fair market value; this practice helps shield insurer balance sheets and income statements against
capital market volatility. Additionally, surpluses to be shared with policyholders are conventionally
computed using realized gains and losses. By contrast, those pressing for fair market valuation of
insurer assets seek to determine and distribute surpluses generated by unrealized as well as realized
gains and losses. Of course this introduces additional volatility into the insurer’s balance sheet,
which could undermine insurer profitability and erase the appeal of retirement annuities. In addition
to the accounting-related asset return smoothing, actuaries regularly smooth surplus payouts using a
buffer fund on the liability side of the life insurer’s balance sheet, known as the contingency reserve
position.
For firms outside the insurance sector, international and general US accounting standards
have moved from historical cost to fair market valuation, requiring that firms’ financial statements
report both liabilities and assets at market values. According to US Financial Accounting Standard
FAS 157, fair market values are measured as quoted prices from orderly transactions of identical
assets in active markets, or on a mark-to-model approach.1 When assets are recorded at fair market
values, unrealized gains and losses influence company balance sheets and can also impact their
income statements. FMV proponents contend that mark-to-market prices improve transparency since
they reflect current market conditions, depict the true financial status of the insurer, and provide an
effective early warning mechanism for investors, creditors, and regulators (Bleck and Liu 2007).
This allows capital providers to evaluate the ex-ante risk and return profile of a potential investment
in the firm and to monitor the use of its capital by managers ex post (c.f., Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and
Walther 2010). Opponents argue that FMV can be misleading for assets held to maturity, may not be
reliable if based on model prices, and could lead to undesirable firm actions. In the context of banks,
Allen and Carletti (2008) and Sapra (2008) argue that mark-to-market valuation of illiquid assets can
result in fire sales, downward spirals, as well as contagion between financial institutions in a

1

A similar definition is used according to International Accounting Standards (IAS).
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financial crisis. Heaton, Lucas, and McDonald (2010) show, in a general equilibrium context, how
mark-to-market accounting can negatively impact the real economy during a financial crisis.2
Despite the central importance of these actuarial and accounting rules for the life insurance
industry, little has been written on the economic and financial impacts of these valuation approaches
on annuitants and the insurance companies offering these policies. In point of fact, smoothing
permits losses to be deferred, but when assets must be sold to pay the benefits (and losses realized),
this can trigger large reductions in benefit payments and challenge firm solvency. Smoothing also
defers gains, and when the gains are realized, benefits can increase due to the larger value of the
contingency reserve. To analyze these behaviors, we develop a model of a participating life annuity
to show how using historical cost versus fair market valuation of assets can shape outcomes, as well
as a contingency fund for liabilities can shape both policyholder wellbeing and insurer profitability.
We illustrate how such actuarial and accounting techniques can be welfare-enhancing, in that riskaverse consumers may benefit substantially when insurers smooth asset and longevity surprises.
Our paper is related to the debate in the accounting literature about the pros and cons of fair
market value accounting (FMA) versus historical cost accounting (HCA). In the U.S., most life
insurance companies follow statutory accounting principles recommended by National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which generally allow the recording of assets at historical
costs.3 According to HCA, asset values are reported at purchase prices and updated later for
amortization, but not for increases in market values (c.f., Laux and Leuz 2009, 2010). When market
values decline, write-downs depend on how assets are classified in conjunction with an impairment
test. For assets classified as “available for sale,” write-downs are required, while those classified as
“held-to maturity” are only written down when declines are perceived as non-temporary. There is
some discretion for the company to classify assets across these categories. Exactly how these
practices affect insurer behavior is, as yet, not well understood. Ellul et al. (2013) provide empirical
evidence that HCA led US insurers to engage in strategic trading during the financial crisis, seeking

2

Nevertheless Laux and Leuz (2010), using data on US banks, found no evidence that fair-value accounting
created or exacerbated the severity of the 2008 financial crisis.
3
For a comprehensive discussion of accounting for insurance companies see, e.g., Herget et al. (2008) and
Lombardi (2009).
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to protect their solvency capital.4 And the Society of Actuaries (2013) recently noted that smoothing
methods are important for “what financial results get disclosed in terms of funding rules, reported
values and statutory reporting.”5
Our paper also builds on a growing literature regarding how households can use life
annuities as retirement income instruments in a private accounts funded pension system.6 To date,
however, these studies have focused mainly on the demand side, analyzing the welfare implications
of having access to various types of life annuities and investigating when to optimally purchase life
annuities.7 Few have examined the relationship between accounting and actuarial policies, and
insurer supply of these products.8 Moreover, most studies of household portfolio choice and
annuitization have focused on fixed payout annuities, where the insurer takes on all capital market as
well as mortality risk. A few studies have evaluated investment-linked/unit-linked annuities where
the insurer passes on the investment risk to the policyholder, and also the longevity risk can be
shared between the annuitant and the insurer.9 Most interesting is the case of participating annuities,
which offer retirees access to the mortality credit as well as a smoothed payout stream over their
remaining lifetimes.
In what follows, we provide a coherent analysis of PLAs from the perspective of the annuity
purchaser and the insurer providing the annuity, and we examine how different accounting and
actuarial rules influence results. Our goal is to show how these rules shape consumer utility and
insurer profitability. To this end, we first discuss benefit smoothing within a stylized 2-period model.
Subsequently, we develop a full-fledged, realistically calibrated stochastic asset-liability model of a
life insurance company that offers a PLA, and we show how using historical cost versus fair market
valuation of assets and maintaining a buffer fund influence both policyholder welfare and insurer
4

Specifically, they concluded that life insurers sought to shore up capital by selectively sells assets with high
unrealized gains, whereas property and casualty firms did not.
5
While not our primary focus here, in a related discussion various authors continue to debate what interest rate
should be used to discount guaranteed annuity payments from pension plans (c.f., Hann, Heflin, and
Subramanayam 2007, Comprix and Muller 2011, Jorgensen 2004, Novy-Marx and Rauh 2011).
6
Work in the area includes Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (2001), Davidoff, Brown, and
Diamond (2005), Milevsky and Young (2007), Horneff, Maurer, and Rogalla (2010).
7
Other researchers seek to explain why households seem not to annuitize much; see Inkman, Lopez, and
Michaelidis (2011).
8
In a recent paper, Koijen and Yogo (2013) study the impact of financial and regulatory frictions on the supply
side of life insurance.
9
See Piggott, Valdez, and Detzel (2005), Denuit, Haberman, and Renshaw (2011), Richter and Weber (2011),
Maurer, Mitchell, Rogalla, and Kartashov (2013).
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profitability. The findings are likely to be of substantial interest to policymakers seeking to spur
growth in the annuity market to enhance old-age security for those needing to manage their 401(k)
plan drawdowns in retirement.10

2. A Stylized Model of Participating Life Annuity with Payout Smoothing
2.1 Setup
To fix ideas, we first devise a simple 2-period model of a stylized PLA to illustrate the
circumstances under which smoothing annuity payouts over time can increase annuitants’ lifetime
0, an individual

utility and add value to the insurer. The model setup is as follows: at time

purchases a PLA that, in the absence of payout smoothing, promises to pay the value of one fund
1 and

unit (FU) at time

2, subject to the annuitant being alive.11 For notational convenience,

we assume that the individual survives to

1 with certainty and to

2 with probability . Under

this assumption, and based on the actuarial equivalence principle, the premium charged by the
insurer per PLA sold amounts to 1
selling the PLA to

, where

annuitants, the insurer’s initial reserves amount to

benefit payouts, these reserves will decrease by

0. On

is the value of one FU at time

FUs at time

1, and by

⋅ 1
⋅

FUs. Due to
FUs at time

2, leaving the insurer with depleted reserves at the end of the model horizon.12
As time progresses, the FU value changes according to a binomial process: each period, it
can either increase or decrease by a proportional factor
⋅

may be worth either
⋅

,

⋅

,

⋅

or
⋅

, or

or . Consequently at time

, while at time
⋅

1, the FUs

2, their value may be

. Since PLA payouts are denominated in FUs,

these price fluctuations (capital market movements) directly affect benefits paid to annuitants. By

10

For instance Mark Iwry, senior adviser to the US Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Assistant Secretary
for retirement and health policy, has stated that “[o]ne solution is to provide for a predictable lifetime stream of
income, such as an annuity provided under a retirement plan or IRA. By pooling those who live shorter and
longer than average, everybody can essentially put away what’s necessary to reach the average life expectancy,
and those who live longer than average will be protected.” (Steverman, 2012).
11
Fund Units may represent a mutual fund or a single asset such as a stock. Hence, our model PLA can also be
regarded as a unit-linked annuity. As we restrict our analysis to a 2-period model, we posit that the annuitant
does not live to
3.
12
This requires a sufficiently large number
of annuitants, such that the insurer can perfectly eliminate
individual longevity risks through pooling. Moreover, this requires that the survival probability
is
deterministic and known at time
0. Hence, we abstract from systematic mortality risk.
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contrast, the insurer is not at risk because capital market risk is hedged by investing the collected
premiums into the FUs underlying the PLA.
To mitigate the impact of FU price risk on annuity payouts, we now introduce a smoothing
factor

∈ 0; 1 , representing the fraction of a FU that is deducted from (added to) the regular

payout every time the FU value has increased (decreased) in the prior period. If, for example, the FU
at

value increased to

1, the annuitant receives a payout of only 1

. If, on the other hand, the FU value decreased to
FUs, worth 1
payout is 1

⋅

. Correspondingly, at time

FUs, worth 1

⋅

, the annuitant receives a payout of 1
2, if the FU value increases from

to

, the

. Any FUs not paid out after a price increase are retained by the insurer, while

the insurer must cover the additional payouts triggered by price drops. Figure 1 summarizes the
alternative developments of the FU price and the corresponding evolution of annuity payouts and
reserves held by the insurer after payouts are made.
Figure 1 here
This smoothing process reduces payout volatility, although it also reduces the expected
benefit since the value of the FUs withheld in good states exceeds the value of the additional FUs
received in bad states. From the annuitant’s perspective, this may be appealing depending on the
utility-maximizing smoothing factor . Concurrently, the insurer’s position is no longer risk-free.
0 , the insurer’s reserves are always depleted after the

That is, in the absence of smoothing (i.e.

final annuity payouts have been made. With smoothing, however, the insurer will either have some
FUs left or be some FUs short at time

2, depending on how the capital market develops. Hence,

from the perspective of the insurer, the question is whether the potential gains from retaining some
FUs in up-states compensate sufficiently for the risk taken.

2.2 Deriving the Optimal Smoothing Factor
Next we take the annuitant’s perspective and derive the smoothing factor

that maximizes

utility. To this end, we posit that the annuitant’s preferences can be described by a time-separable
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) lifetime utility function defined over consumption:
⋅

1

⋅

⋅

1

,

(1)
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with consumption

1

at time

risk aversion, a time preference of
expectation at time

2 equal to the PLA payouts, a coefficient

, and a probability of survival of

0 under the subjective probability measure

to

of relative

2. Here,

is the
1

, with

representing the subjective probability for an increase (decrease) in FU prices.
Substituting the PLA payout stream described in Figure 1 into the lifetime utility function
and maximizing it with respect to the smoothing factor , we get:13

(2a)

with
∙

⋅

⋅

∙

⋅

⋅

⋅
(2b)

If

, the smoothing factor

is positive, i.e. smoothing will increase utility. For risk-averse

investors with a typical coefficient of relative risk aversion of
when the subjective probability for a market downturn (
difference between

.

⋅

1, smoothing will be appealing

) and/or the volatility of FU prices (i.e. the

and ) are sufficiently high. In these situations, the potential utility loss from a

capital market downturn cannot be compensated by the possible utility gain resulting from an
increase in FU prices. Hence the annuitant will be willing to give up some upside potential as
insurance against adverse capital market developments, as we will discuss more fully below.
Turning to the insurer’s perspective, we next identify the smoothing factor that maximizes
the value for the PLA provider. The insurer’s gains/losses from smoothing PLA payouts depend on
the number and value of the FUs remaining at time

2 (see Figure 1). This payoff profile

resembles a complex derivative strategy, a combination of two path-dependent options, which can be
replicated by a dynamically rebalanced portfolio of the risky asset and (risk-free) cash.
Consequently, it can be priced using risk-neutral valuation. Following this approach, it can easily be
shown that the value

the insurer receives from payoff smoothing is given by:
1

13

See Appendix A for details.

⋅

⋅
1

1

⋅

⋅ ,

(3)
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with risk-free interest rate and a risk-neutral probability of an upward jump . The value generated
for the insurer is a linear function of the smoothing factor ; it is increasing in the smoothing factor
as long as the term in the squared brackets is positive. This is the case as long as the following
relation between

and

holds:14
1
2

⋅
1

.

(4)

The insurer profits from rising FU prices, since more valuable FUs will be retained. Hence
the gains increase with the probability that FU prices increase. At the same time, higher FU price
volatility (i.e. the difference between

and ) will also increase the insurer’s profit, inasmuch as the

value of potential FU subsidies decreases when the value of potential FU withholdings increases.
In summary, this example shows that PLA payout smoothing adds value to both annuitant
and insurer, as long as certain restrictions are met with respect to possible capital market
developments, and as long as the annuitant believes that FU prices will drop with a particular
probability.

2.3 Numerical Example
To provide additional insight into the conditions under which smoothing is beneficial, as
well as the magnitude of the optimal smoothing factor, we next use reasonable calibrations for the
parameters involved to evaluate analytical solutions for the framework just laid out. We assume that
the annuitant has a time preference rate of

0.96. The probability of survival to

2 is set to

0.8, which is approximately the 10-year survival probability of a US male aged 65 in 2013.
1.2,

With respect to the capital market, we study two calibrations: a lower volatility regime with
and a higher volatility regime with

1.3 (in both cases

1/ ). The first value corresponds to

the development of annual total returns on the S&P 500 over the period 1981 through 2012, while
the second value focuses on the recent financial crisis and limits the calibration period to 2008
through 2012.
We seek to determine the subjective threshold probability of a market downturn
which smoothing will be beneficial for the annuitant. To find this threshold, we equate

∗

, beyond
and

in

Under the typical assumption
1/ , this inequality is always fulfilled (see Hull 2000, ch. 9.7, for details
on how to calibrate a binomial model to historical data).

14

9

Equation (2b) and solve for the subjective probability. Figure 2 presents the results for a range of risk
aversion values

and the two capital market specifications discussed above.

Figure 2 here
As one would expect, the threshold probability is decreasing in the level of risk aversion. If
payout smoothing is to increase utility, an annuitant with a low risk aversion of

2 must believe

that markets will drop with a probability of around 40% or more. Conversely, a very risk averse
annuitant with

10 benefits from smoothing even if he believes that there is a 95% probability

that the markets will go up. With
annuitant has a threshold probability of
with

5, our baseline calibration in subsequent analyses, the
∗

18.9% 10.9% in the low (high) volatility regime

1.2 1.3 .
Table 1 presents utility-maximizing smoothing factors , the corresponding welfare gains for

the annuitant, and the profits the insurer can generate by offering such a PLA. We show these for our
two capital market calibrations for individuals with low, medium, and high risk aversion (
2, 5, and 10), and for two subjective probabilities of market downturns (

0.2 and 0.5). These

latter probabilities are derived by calibrating our binomial model to historical returns on the S&P500,
with the probability of 20% (50%) corresponding to observations over the period 1981 (2008)
through 2012.
Table 1 here
Results in Table 1 show that our baseline annuitant with medium risk aversion will optimally
chose a PLA with a smoothing factor of 0.7%, when he faces both low volatility and a low
probability of a market downturn. This results in a small welfare gain of about one basis point,
measured in terms of an increase in the certainty-equivalent fixed life annuity. An insurer offering
such a PLA can generate a profit in the amount of 0.1% of the PLA premium. As indicated in Figure
2, the subjective market downturn probability of 20% is only marginally above the threshold value
beyond which smoothing is beneficial, which explains the modest amount of smoothing in this case.
If, by contrast, the individual is exposed to a capital market having higher volatility and a higher
(subjective) probability of a market downturn, he will elect a PLA with a much larger smoothing
factor, 20.7%. In other words, the annuitant would be willing to forfeit one-fifth of his benefit in

10

good times, so as to have his payout increased by the same fraction when markets go down. Such a
PLA generates a welfare gain of about 9.5% and a profit for the insurer of 2.7% of the annuity
premium. Not surprisingly, in all scenarios, more risk averse individuals choose a higher level of
smoothing. While the less risk averse do not demand smoothing in a normal capital market
environment, in a high volatility scenario such as the present, they prefer a substantial smoothing
factor of 13% for a welfare increase of 1.7 percent.
This simplified two-period model illustrates how PLA payout smoothing can be beneficial
for both the annuitant and the insurer, where benefit payments are linked to the value of the
underlying fund units meaning capital market risk is smoothed. Nevertheless we have not yet
considered mortality risk, so next we turn to a more complete framework. This extends our model to
incorporate mortality, and to generalize it to more periods and more assets. Most importantly, we
allow two methods of smoothing using both actuarial and accounting techniques, and we examine
their tradeoffs. To this we turn next.

3. Analyzing a More Complex Participating Life Annuity Contract
3.1 Setup and Product Design
To illustrate how payout smoothing works in a more realistic setting, we construct a model
of a stylized life-insurance company that sells single premium participating life annuity contracts. In
addition to realistic accounting and actuarial smoothing techniques, we incorporate capital market
risk, and systematic as well as idiosyncratic mortality risk. Our stylized product model is closely
modeled on the TIAA Traditional Annuity offered by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), one of the most important life
insurance companies operating in the US market.15
The product we model is a participating life annuity (PLA) which provides retirees with
lifetime guaranteed benefits plus non-guaranteed surplus payments.16 To price the guaranteed

15

In 2012, TIAA-CREF supervised 3.6 million annuity contracts and managed assets of $487B. In the
European market, participating life annuity products are offered comparable to the TIAA product outlined in
the text; see Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin (2013) for a detailed discussion.
16
The TIAA Traditional Annuity also builds up capital during the accumulation phase, whereby contributions
paid by policyholders earn a minimum guaranteed yearly interest rate (depending on the vintage when
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benefits, the company uses a specific mortality table in combination with an assumed interest rate to
discount benefits (also called the guaranteed interest rate). The non-guaranteed surplus is determined
annually by the insurer’s Board of Trustees as a percentage of the guaranteed benefit and paid to
annuitants the following year. The potential to generate surpluses stems from two sources: the
insurer’s experience on investment returns, and the realized annuitant pool mortality. When the
return on the insurer’s asset portfolio backing the liability due to promised annuity benefits exceeds
the guaranteed interest rate, and/or if realized annuitant mortality is higher than expected, the
insurance company earns a surplus. The company can influence the expected risk and return profile
of uncertain surplus payments by its choice of assets in its portfolio. In addition, the insurance
company can smooth the policyholder surpluses. To this end, accounting smoothing based on
accounting standards, and actuarial smoothing based on building up reserves, both play central roles.
Accounting smoothing arises from the fact that unrealized gains and losses on assets are not
used to calculate the investment return used to specify policyholder surpluses. In the U.S., most life
insurance companies follow statutory accounting principles recommended by National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These are specific accounting guidelines for insurers which
permit the companies to value their bond portfolios in their annual statements using the historical
cost approach. That is, these assets are recorded at their prices when purchased, and values are not
updated for (non-credit related) changes in market values as long as they are unrealized.17
Actuarial smoothing results from withholding a part of the surplus earned in good years to
support surplus payments in bad years. To this end, the insurer is permitted to build a special position
on the liability side of its balance sheet, the so-called contingency reserve. Allocations into and
withdrawals from the contingency reserve are governed by the insurer’s Board of Trustees with
guidance from the firm’s actuaries.
In what follows, we introduce our realistically-calibrated company model for a pool of PLA
policyholders with uncertain capital markets and mortality dynamics incorporating the above

premiums are paid) plus a non-guaranteed surplus. Here we concentrate only on the liquidation phase of the
product.
17
See Lombardi (2009) for further details on valuation requirements. Also, under NAIC rules, insurers may
discount the liabilities resulting from the guaranteed benefit with a fixed interest rate specified at the beginning
of the contract (i.e. the guaranteed interest rate). See for instance TIAA-CREF (2011).
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mentioned institutional features. Our goal is to spell out the implications of these various smoothing
techniques from the perspective of the policyholder (i.e. the benefit stream) and the life insurance
company (i.e., profitability and solvency), within such a realistic setting.

3.2 The Insurance Provider
We assume that the insurance company sells PLA contracts paying guaranteed lifetime
benefits

to

individuals of the same age

(i.e. the pool is closed after the sale). The premium

per contract paid at time is calculated according to:

⋅

∏

Here

1

1

.

(5)

is the k-period survival probability at age

mortality rates used in the industry, and

, the

are actuarial

is the terminal age of the mortality table.

refers to the

firm’s guaranteed interest rate.18 To reflect the guaranteed annuity payment obligations, the
insurance company builds a special reserve position on the liability side of its balance sheet, called
the actuarial reserve. At time
⋅

0, the actuarial reserve is equal to the total premium collected, i.e.

. Multiplying the surviving number of annuitants

by the present value of remaining

benefits, given in equation (5), describes the evolution of the actuarial reserve in subsequent years,
⋅ .
The insurer invests the total premium collected into a portfolio of dividend-paying stocks
and bonds paying coupons. This portfolio is recorded as the General Account on the asset side of the
balance sheet of the insurance company, and at

0 , it is equal to the actuarial reserve. At the

beginning of each subsequent year, the insurance company pays annuitant benefits from asset
income (dividends/coupons) and from assets sold at market prices. The stochastic dynamics of the
market prices of stocks are governed by a geometric random walk with drift and the evolution of
bond prices is driven by a 3-Factor CIR term structure model (see Appendix B).
Depending on the insurer’s investment and mortality experience, annuitants may receive
surplus payments in addition to their guaranteed benefit. This surplus is generated when the insurer’s
18

Here and throughout the analysis, we disregard explicit costs in terms of loadings, as these are not critical to
our model.
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total investment return exceeds the

, and/or when actual policyholder mortality exceeds that

assumed when the annuity was price. The determination of the actual surplus generated by the
insurer and, hence, the amounts paid out to annuitants, depend on a complex set of rules specified by
the insurance company, to which we turn next.
generated by the insurer is given by:

The total annual surplus

,

where the mortality surplus is

and

(6)

refers to the asset surplus. The mortality surplus arises

from the difference between realized and anticipated mortality in the annuitant pool. Formally, the
mortality surplus is calculated as:

⋅

where

,

is the actuarial reserve for the surviving annuitants.

(7)

represents the stochastic number of

living annuitants at time , is given by:

.

Here,
1, … , ;

represents an indicator variable

which takes the value of one if the annuitant

is alive at time , and 0 if the annuitant has died. Over time, the sequence of

indicator variables

for each annuitant forms a Markov chain with:
1

where

(8)

1

1

0

1

0

0

,
,

(9)

1,

is the actual mortality rate of annuitants of age

at time . Actual mortality rates can

differ from those used to price the PLA, as they are stochastic; their dynamics are modeled as in
Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006) (see also Appendix B). Accordingly our model incorporates both
idiosyncratic longevity risk (uncertainty about individual lifetimes), and also systematic longevity
risk (uncertainty about the mortality table).
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The insurer’s asset surplus naturally depends on the stochastic dynamics of the underlying
stock/bond portfolio, and also on how the insurer values the assets. The relevant valuation method is
determined by the accounting category into which each asset is classified. According to US
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, three asset categories are allowable: assets held to
maturity, assets held for trading purposes, and assets available for sale (see e.g., Herget et al. 2008).
Assets held to maturity are valued at amortized cost when acquired (historical cost valuation, or
HCV); in this case, changes in asset prices are only recognized as gains or losses when the
instruments are sold. Assets held for trading purposes are reported at fair market value (FMV), so
price changes immediately affect the insurer’s profits whether or not they are realized.19 Assets
available for sale are also reported at FMV, yet unrealized gains and losses resulting from market
price fluctuations are not stated in the insurer’s profit and loss statement (P&L). Instead, they are
carried in a separate account on the liability side of the insurer’s balance sheet, known as the Other
Comprehensive Income account (OCI). When these assets are sold, the OCI account is reversed, and
realized gains or losses are recorded in the P&L.
Formally, when using FMV, the insurer’s investment return on stocks,
,

,

, is given by:

,

⋅

,

⋅

,

⋅
,

⋅

,

,

⋅

⋅

where

and on bonds,

,

(

,

) denotes the number of bond fund units (stocks) held in year ;

price of the bond fund unit (stock) at time t;

(

(10a)

(10b)

( ) refers to the

is the coupon (dividend) payment received on

each bond fund unit (stock); and

represents payments to individual annuitants. As indicated

above,

is the number of policyholders in the pool.

is the actuarial reserve, and

Under the historical cost valuation method (or the other comprehensive income valuation
approach), the corresponding returns

19

,

and

,

are calculated as:

Under USGAAP, the default category of bonds (stocks) refers to those available for sale (held for trading)
purposes. By contrast, under NAIC accounting, bonds are classified as held to maturity by default.
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,

,

⋅

,

⋅

,

(11a)

⋅
,

,

⋅

,

⋅

,

(11b)

⋅

with

,

,

the number of stocks sold, and

,

the number of bond units sold.

,

According to the OCI approach, unrealized gains and losses from price fluctuations are neutralized
using the OCI account, which develops according to
,

⋅

⋅

,

0. Therefore, investment returns are given by equations (11a)

where

and (11b).
To some extent, life insurers may choose between the various valuation methods for their
asset holdings. Naturally their choices have consequences for the asset surplus of the participating
annuity. To study the impact of categorizing assets into different accounting valuation regimes, we
define two parameters,

and

, that specify the fraction of stocks and bonds valued using HCV
is

(or OCI). Given those ratios and asset returns, the insurer’s realized total investment return
calculated as:
⋅

1

,

⋅

,

1

⋅

,

⋅

,

.

(12)

Based on realized total investment returns, the firm’s asset surplus for the pool is determined by:
⋅

After the period’s total surplus,

∙

.

(13)

, is determined, it must be distributed among annuitants

and the insurer. To this end, we posit that the annuitants receive a fixed allocation percentage
subject to several constraints. Since the insurance company guarantees lifelong minimum benefits,
policyholders do not participate in negative surpluses. Consequently negative surpluses directly
decrease the insurer’s equity capital. In addition, the level of surplus depends on the insurer’s
solvency capital, which includes three components: the insurer´s equity capital, the value of its OCI
account, and its contingency reserve. When the insurer’s solvency capital exceeds a pre-specified
solvency limit, an amount

⋅

is allocated to the policyholders; consequently, the insurance
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company keeps 1
limit, we posit that

⋅

of the surplus. When the insurer’s solvency capital falls below the

is reduced by 50%, i.e. only 0.5 ⋅

⋅

is allocated to the annuitants. The

insurer thus retains the total surplus if no equity capital remains.20 Accordingly, the portion of total
, is given by:

surplus allocated to policyholders,
max 0;
∙
max 0; 0.5 ∙
0,

where

is the insurer´s equity,

∙
∙

,
∙

,

(14)

0

is the value of the OCI account, and

defined here as a fraction of the actuarial reserve. The surplus
reserve

0
0

is the solvency limit,

is allocated to the contingency

.
Next, the insurance company must determine how much surplus to pay to the annuitants,

defined as

, and how much to retain in the contingency reserve. Typically this decision is made

by the firm’s Board of Trustees and informed by the insurer’s chief actuary; the goal is to smooth
annuitant payouts over time, given each year’s realized surplus and the level of the contingency
reserve. While the specifics of the decision process are not formally prescribed, we can characterize
it using an algorithm which embodies both a backward- and a forward-looking component. By the
backward-looking component, the current payout should be set in such a way that it is as similar as
possible to the previous year’s payout. The forward-looking element seeks to preserve this surplus
stability in future years as well; this is implemented by maintaining a certain target level of the
contingency reserve. To balance these two, the insurer will determine

such that the following

objective function is maximized:
max

(15a)

where

20

We posit that the annuity provider is part of an insurance group, so if the annuity provider’s equity capital
drops below zero, the parent company brings additional equity capital to pay guaranteed benefits. This
precludes the need for us to take on the computational burden of modeling the consequences of formal
insolvency.
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2

(15b)

4⋅

∈

1

;

2

,

(15c)

1

(15d)

,

0

(15e)

(15f)

The objective function is concave and it has two terms, the polynomials
functions depend on the endogenous variable

. Both

and reach their maximum when the expressions

within all parentheses are equal to one. Moreover, function
⁄

and

depends on two components. The term

seeks to keep annuitants’ surplus payouts as close as possible to the previous period’s

level, where

is the previous period’s surplus payout adjusted for the change in the size of the

annuitant cohort

⁄

. The term

penalizes (rewards) the withholding of
is higher (lower) than

current realized surplus from annuitants when

. In other words,

when the current surplus falls below (is above) last year’s payout, the firm has an incentive to reduce
(increase) payouts. To avoid extreme fluctuations in the surplus payouts, the surplus may vary only
within a predefined boundary (equation 15d). For example, if

1.25, the minimum (maximum)

payout to each annuitant in the current year is 80% (125%) of last year’s payout.
Function

is intended to sustain the insurer’s ability to pay stable future surpluses. It

reaches its maximum when the contingency reserve

equals the target value

, where the

latter is a fraction of the current actuarial reserve. Inserting the transition equation (15e) into (15c)
shows that the insurer withdraws from the contingency reserve when its previous level exceeds the
target, i.e.

if

.

The interaction between the terms

and

reflects the tradeoff between paying

policyholders more today, versus maintaining the insurer’s stability for the future. In a period of high
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surplus, the

function would call for increased benefit payments, but this will only be realized when

the contingency reserve is high enough (according to the
is too low, the

function). But if the contingency reserve

function inhibits the call for benefit increases. Conversely, in a period of low

surplus, benefits would be reduced according to the

function, unless a sufficiently high level of the

contingency reserve encourages the insurer to maintain or even increase the benefit level.
Finally, the insurer’s next year equity capital develops according to:
∙ 1

,1
∙ 1

where

∙ 1
,1

,

∙

(16)

,

, 1 is the 1-year government bond spot rate, and

is the dividend rate paid to

shareholders. The dividend is only paid if the insurer’s next year solvency capital is adequate.

3.3 The Policyholder
To quantify how individuals with different risk aversion and time preferences value the
stochastic PLA income stream, we use an expected utility framework as in Section 2. Specifically,
policyholder preferences are modeled using a time additive constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function as follows:

.

1

Here

(17)

denotes the consumer’s coefficient of relative risk aversion and the discount factor

<1

represents the individual’s subjective time preference. Following Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin
(2013), the expected lifetime utility
equivalent fixed life annuity

from the PLA benefit stream is transformed into a utility-

:

1
∑

.

(18)

The EA can be interpreted as the constant guaranteed lifetime income stream that the annuitant will
require to give up the upside potential of a PLA with stochastic surpluses.
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4 Numerical Evaluation
4.1 Setup and Calibration
Next we describe the impact of actuarial and accounting smoothing on PLA policyholder
utility and insurer profitability. We do so by simulating 5,000 independent sample paths of an insurer
selling the PLA described above to a cohort of 10,000 males age 65 in 2013. Our goal is to compare
the outcome for two cases: the first where surpluses are smoothed using the historical cost approach
(accounting smoothing), and the second where assets are evaluating using historical costs and where
actuarial reserves for liabilities are accumulated (accounting and actuarial smoothing).
We model a PLA paying a guaranteed lifetime benefit of $10,000 per year. Premiums for
guaranteed benefits as well as the actuarial reserve in later years are calculated using an interest rate
of 3% per year (similar to the TIAA Traditional Annuity), and the Annuity 2000 mortality table
recommended by the Society of Actuaries with an age shift of four years. These assumptions imply a
single premium per contract of $163,399. In addition to the guaranteed benefits, the insurer promises
to pay surpluses to the annuitants as described above. The surplus allocation parameter specifying
how annuitants participate in total surpluses is assumed to be

90%. The surplus paid to

policyholders in the first year is set to 2% of the guaranteed benefit. Also we assume that the
company has equity capital worth 4% of the actuarial reserves, which we set as the solvency limit in
equation (14).21
Next we describe the firm’s initial balance sheet. The liability side includes the actuarial
reserve, the contingency reserve, and the firm’s equity capital. Without actuarial smoothing, the
initial and targeted values of the contingency reserve are set to 0%. With actuarial smoothing, the
initial contingency reserve is set to 5% of the actuarial reserve and the target contingency reserve is
set to 10%.22 Assets backing the actuarial reserve are held in the general account and invested in a
constant-mix portfolio of stocks and bonds with a target duration of 10 years. The asset side also

21

In doing so, we are informed by TIAA-CREF’s 2011 financial statement which reported equity capital of
$2B and an actuarial reserve of $175B (page 6). In addition TIAA-CREF reported valuation reserves (i.e. the
difference between fair market minus book/adjusted carrying value), which increases the effective equity
capital substantially. Since the initial valuation reserve in our model is zero, we adjust for this using a higher
equity capital ratio.
22
The TIAA-CREF 2011 financial statement reported a contingency reserve ($23B) worth 13% of the actuarial
reserve ($175B; page 6).
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includes a cash account corresponding to the contingency reserve and the insurer’s equity capital.
This earns an interest rate equal to the one-year spot rate given by the term structure model (see
Appendix B).
Using our simulation results, we calculate the equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA) which
would provide the same lifetime utility as the PLA. In our base case we stipulate a relative risk
aversion of

5 and a time preference factor of

0.96; these are subsequently varied in

sensitivity analyses. The policyholder’s subjective survival probabilities

are derived as in

Appendix B. To explore the impact of actuarial and accounting techniques on annuitants’ benefits
and firm profitability, we permit the firm to select its asset allocation and choice of accounting
method. To this end, we vary the asset allocation in the general account from all bonds to all stocks,
and the valuation approach from all assets at historical cost (HCV Ratio
assets at fair market (HCV Ratio

100%), to all

0%), all in 10% steps. In sensitivity analysis, we also

allow for bonds to be valued according to the OCI instead of the HCV approach.

4.2 The Annuitant’s Perspective
Figure 3 shows how alternative smoothing approaches influence annuitant wellbeing. Panel
A involves only accounting smoothing but not actuarial smoothing; Panel B adds in actuarial
smoothing. The graph on the left of each Panel depicts the benefit that a fixed life annuity (FLA)
must pay so as to generate the same utility as the PLA with a guaranteed benefit of $10,000 plus a
variable surplus, for a range of asset allocations. The solid line reflects FLA values under HCV
accounting, while the dotted line reflects the range of FLAs under fair market valuation. On the right,
we illustrate the utility impact of permitting intermediate or blended accounting regimes, combining
HCV and FMV in different proportions, again for a range of asset allocations.
Figure 3 here
Specifically, when the insurer invests only in bonds, the FLA is worth 8% more under full
HCV accounting than under the FMV methord ($12,300 vs. $11,400; see Panel A1). Similar utility
increases are observed for other asset allocations. In other words, if the only smoothing being
undertaken is attributable to the accounting approach, historical cost valuation dominates fair market
valuation from the annuitant’s perspective. Moreover, utility rises as the fraction in bonds increases,
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but it turns down after about 70 percent. This holds regardless of the accounting rule: that is,
diversification is beneficial, independent of the valuation approach selected.
In Panel A2, we see that the utility-equivalent FLA surface generally slopes upward as more
assets are valued using the HCV approach, given a specific bond percentage. This is because using a
higher HCV fraction lowers capital market volatility and thus generates a smoother surplus payout
stream, which the policyholder prefers. Nevertheless, using only HCV is suboptimal because returns
resulting from asset price appreciation are not immediately allocated to the surplus, which reduces
the annuitant’s payout. This is particularly relevant for stocks whose major source of return is asset
price appreciation. Consequently, it is preferable to account for at least some of the portfolio using
fair market valuation rules. For our base case with

5, the annuitant’s optimal outcome would be

for the insurer to hold 40 percent in bonds and use historical cost valuation for 80 percent of the
assets, yielding a utility level equivalent to that of a fixed life annuity of almost $13,000.
Panel B illustrates how the annuitant’s perspective changes when the insurer can smooth
using both accounting and actuarial methods. For a given portfolio allocation, Panel B1 shows that
the utility equivalent outcomes are now more similar between the HCV and the FMV approaches.
Compared to Panel A1, FMV plus actuarial smoothing results in utility increases of about 5%,
independent of asset allocation. This is because the actuarial smoothing dampens the surplus
volatility introduced by FMV. By contrast, with the HCV approach, adding actuarial smoothing
results in lower utility with an all-bond allocation by about 2%, and by about 4% for an all-stock
allocation. In other words, too much smoothing is not preferred by the PLA policyholder. Focusing
last on the two curves in Panel B1, neither valuation regime clearly dominates. When the actuary
removes substantial volatility via smoothing, the annuitant will prefer a higher stock fraction as
compared to the case without actuarial smoothing.
As before, Panel B2 confirms that the utility-equivalent FLA surface rises as more assets are
valued using the HCV approach, given a particular bond percentage. Yet the accounting regime now
has less of an impact on utility levels than before. There is again an interior maximum to the surface:
in our base case with

5, the annuitant would like the insurer to hold 60 percent in bonds and use

historical cost valuation for 70 percent of the assets, yielding a utility level equivalent to that of a
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fixed life annuity of almost $12,300. The higher fraction in bonds does curtail surplus volatility, but
it also reduces earnings potential; moreover, actuarial smoothing shifts some of the surplus into the
future, which is also detrimental to utility. The somewhat lower HCV fraction partly offsets these
effects, but not by enough to generate utility comparable to that in Panel A2.
Table 2 also presents additional optimal utility equivalent FLAs for alternative values of risk
aversion. We find the expected result, namely that when only accounting smoothing is available, the
policyholder prefers both a higher bond fraction and a higher HCV ratio with increasing risk
aversion. Including actuarial smoothing boosts the bond percent with no change in the HCV fraction,
confirming our earlier finding that the valuation technique selected matters less in the case of
actuarial smoothing. Finally, for all risk aversion values examined, when actuarial smoothing is in
place, the policyholder can tolerate a higher share of assets valued at fair market.
Table 2 here

4.3 The Insurer’s Perspective
Next we assess the insurer’s perspective regarding asset valuation and smoothing methods.
To this end, we calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) on capital provided by the insurer’s
shareholders for each simulation run. This computation accounts for the initial investment, along
with periodic dividend payments. In addition, it includes what investors receive at the end of the
product’s lifespan, namely the value of equity capital, contingency reserve, and any actuarial
reserves that remain when the last annuitant dies. We also consider the shortfall probability of the
insurer, defined as the percent of times that equity capital is negative when the last policyholder dies.
The time horizon for each simulation run varies depending on when the last annuitant is gone (a
stochastic event).
Figure 4 plots the internal rate of return and shortfall probability as a function of the
insurer’s asset allocation and the accounting regime in place. Panel A presents results for the
accounting smoothing alone, while Panel B reports findings where both the accounting and actuarial
smoothing techniques are in force. For alternative asset allocations, Panel A1 plots the expected IRR
for the two polar cases of the pure historical cost versus pure fair market accounting regimes. Clearly
HCV dominates FMV in terms of IRR for all portfolio allocations. Additionally, the HCV produces
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positive expected IRRs in the range of 3-4 percent, whereas the FMV generates expected IRRs of -10
percent for an all-stock allocation, to -0.5 percent for an all-bond portfolio; the IRR is marginally
positive in the middle-range bond allocation.
Figure 4 here
Panel A2 depicts how the expected internal return responds to alternative combinations of
bonds and historical cost versus fair value accounting. Expected IRRs are increasing in the HCV
ratio, a finding that holds for all asset allocation patterns. This occurs since unrealized surpluses must
be paid out to the annuitants under FMV, while the insurer must bear unrealized losses which are not
passed on to policyholders. By contrast, under HCV, unrealized losses from periods of bad
performance are offset by unrealized surpluses from good performance, thus producing a smoothed
impact on payouts. Such fluctuations reduce the value of the options held by annuitants. Moreover,
IRRs are also generally rising with the percentage of the portfolio held in bonds, due to their more
constant payment streams.
Finally, the shading in Figure 4 provides information about the insurer’s shortfall
probability, with darker areas representing more risk. Not surprisingly, holding an all-stock
allocation along with the FMV approach is associated with a 20-25 percent shortfall probability; the
insurer’s equity capital would then be zero or negative. Moving toward a pure historical cost
valuation, as well as to more bonds, substantially reduces the shortfall risk (to 0%).
Panel A3 reports additional information about the development of the shortfall risk over
time, illustrating the four cases of 100 percent bonds/all HCV, 100 percent stocks/all HCV, 100
percent bonds/all FMV, and 100 percent stocks/all FMV. Under both FMV scenarios, the insurer is
exposed to substantial shortfall risk (over 30 percent) early in the retirement phase, which declines
thereafter. Specifically, with the all-bond (all-stock) portfolio, the shortfall risk under fair market
value falls after about year 2, and falls to about 5 (10) percent in the long term. Under the HCV/allbond allocation, there is no shortfall risk, whereas the HCV/all-stock combination provides an
intermediate level (around 10 percent) of shortfall risk that peaks at 7-10 years and fades away
thereafter. Also, under the HCV, an all-stock portfolio has the same shortfall risk as an all-bond
portfolio under FMV. This underscores the strength of the smoothing approach under HCV: that is,

24

in terms of shortfall risk, requiring an insurer to move from historical cost to fair market valuation
has the same impact as requiring the insurer to hold only equity.
Turning to Panel B, where both accounting and actuarial smoothing are available, we note
that the shapes of the expected IRR curves are similar to those presented in Panel A. Under the
historical cost method depicted in Panel B1, expected returns are again positive for all portfolio
allocations. By contrast, under FMV, the curve is more concave than before. The impact of adding
actuarial smoothing is that funds must be set aside in a contingency reserve owned by the
policyholders until the last annuitant dies; at that juncture, remaining assets are paid out to investors.
This results in higher IRRs for the investor, as can be seen when the firm holds a high bond
allocation.
Despite this general tendency, in the FMV scenario with actuarial intervention, the insurer
holding all stocks receives a large negative expected IRR (-15 percent). With the actuary in place, by
contrast, benefit payments are less directly linked to capital market performance; consequently,
annuity payouts can be much higher than in the asset-smoothing only case. In particular, benefits are
less likely to be reduced in bad times, which in turn diminishes investors’ eventual claims. This is
particularly likely when the portfolio allocation is heavy in stocks and it can offset the investor’s
opportunity to retain the contingency reserve.
Comparing Panels A2-B2 and A3-B3, we note that shortfall probabilities under the allstock/FMV scenario are even higher than without actuarial smoothing, and they do not decline as
much with the passage of time. Thus with the all-stock portfolio, the shortfall risk under fair market
value stands at about 17 percent in the long term, compared to 10 percent without actuarial
smoothing. In other words, we conclude that under the historic cost approach, insurer stability and
expected IRRs perform do better if the firm holds mostly bonds. That is, fair market valuation
reduces stability and expected IRRs. Moreover, when the insurer holds mostly bonds, incorporating
actuarial smoothing raises expected IRRs and offers some degree of protection for investors in terms
of expected IRRs and shortfall risk.
To show that investors would find acceptable the utility-maximizing combinations of bond
percentages and HCV ratios reported in Table 2, we summarize in Table 3 the corresponding
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expected IRRs, their volatilities, and shortfall probabilities. Overall, expected IRRs are moderately
positive and shortfall probabilities are acceptably low. For example, given moderately risk-averse
policyholders, accounting smoothing alone produces an expected IRR of 3.61 percent and shortfall
probability of 1.58 percent; with actuarial smoothing, these values are 4.85 percent and 0.75
respectively. A similar pattern holds for other risk aversion patterns, except when very low risk
aversion can produce a very high stock allocation.
Table 3 here
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
To this point, we have modeled insurers as having the freedom to value their assets
according to either HCF or FMV principles. In fact, however, regulators usually set standards for
asset valuation practices. For example, the NAIC requires that bonds be valued according to the
HCV approach by default, and stocks according to FMV. Accordingly, asset allocation will drive the
insurer’s valuation approach. Additionally, in addition to the HCF and FMV approaches, yet a
different accounting valuation technique can also be used by life insurance companies if the latter
issue securities on the stock exchange (as per the Securities and Exchange Commission).23 Known as
the Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) approach, this is the default approach for bonds under US
GAAP.24 Under OCI, assets are reported on the balance sheet using fair market valuation, while
unrealized gains/losses are not reported on the P&L statement but rather tracked in the OCI account.
Using the OCI approach produces identical investment returns as under HCM and hence the
amount of surplus generated, but the two approaches differ with respect to the distribution of
surpluses. This is because unrealized gains and losses recorded in the OCI account are part of the
insurer’s solvency capital, which influences the level of total surplus that can be allocated to
policyholders according to equation (14). Thus, for instance, if the OCI account were sufficiently
negative (positive), surplus distributions to annuitants could be reduced (increased). In what follows,
we explore how our key results change when the insurer adopts OCI valuation instead of the
alternatives.
23

Specifically, the SEC seeks to insure that firm financial reports confirm to US GAAP so as to inform
investors. By contrast, the purpose of the statutory accounting principles under NAIC guidelines is to protect
insurer solvency.
24
Stocks require fair market valuation.
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Figure 5 depicts how these alternative approaches influence both policyholder and insurer
outcomes, with Panel A illustrating the impact of the accounting smoothing alone, while Panel B
reflects what happens after adding actuarial smoothing. The three black lines (solid, dotted, and
dashed) in the Figure illustrate what happens when all of the assets are evaluated according to a
single valuation rule. The two red lines (solid and dashed) indicate results when stocks are valued at
FMV, and bonds according either to HCM (the NAIC default) or OCI (the US GAAP default).
Figure 5 here
It is not surprising that the (red) utility-equivalent value curves of the affected annuity
policyholder under the two mixture approaches lie between the two extremes previously discussed
(Figure 3, Panel A1). When no actuarial smoothing is in effect, the fixed lifetime annuity (FLA)
under OCI (dotted black line) is worth around 3% more than with FMV, for the full range of
portfolio allocations. Despite the fact that unrealized gains/losses do not directly affect surplus under
OCI, losses do reduce the insurer’s equity and through this channel may reduce the allocation of
surplus to the annuitant. This explains why the utility-equivalent FLA is lower than under pure HCV
(solid black line). If US GAAP defaults are in effect (dotted red line), stocks are fair market valued
while bonds are valued using OCI. Consequently, at low bond allocations, US GAAP and FMV
produce the same outcomes; by contrast, with high bond fractions, US GAAP valuations are similar
to those with OCI. We observe similar results for NAIC valuation (solid red line): for a low bond
allocation, results are similar to FMV, while at a high bond percent the pattern tracks that of the
HCV approach. Under the NAIC approach (solid red line), results for low bond allocations are
similar to the FMV outcome, but for higher allocations, the annuitant’s utility equivalent is close to
that under the HCV. Moreover, the NAIC technique provides more value to the annuitant than under
the US GAAP methodology, because the former protects the policyholder from asset volatility with
additional smoothing.
Turning to the insurer’s perspective, Panel A2 makes clear that OCI (dashed black line)
generates expected IRRs above those flowing from historical cost valuation (solid black line) for
most portfolio allocations. This is because under OCI, as described above, even unrealized losses
may reduce the surplus distributed and hence benefit payments. In turn, the investor retains more
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equity capital which reduces the need for shareholders to provide additional capital injections; this
produces a higher expected IRR. By contrast, the insurer strongly disfavors the FMV approach
(black dotted line), which produces negative expected returns across all portfolio allocations. For the
US GAAP, the expected IRR curve (dashed red line) is a weighted average of the FMV and OCI
approaches; for the NAIC curve (solid red line), the result is a weighted average of FMV and HCV.
Overall, expected insurer profitability will be somewhat higher under US GAAP treatment compared
to the NAIC approach, for realistic bond exposures. That is, there is a tension between the
policyholder’s preferred valuation method and that favored by the insurer.
Panel B indicates the impact of adding actuarial smoothing to the mix, and overall the results
are quite similar. A comparison of Panels A1 and B1 shows that the additional smoothing provided
by the actuary has relatively little impact on utility, for low equity exposures; if the insurer were to
hold a riskier portfolio, the actuary’s extra smoothing is slightly welfare-enhancing. Once again,
annuitants see the NAIC technique as more appealing than US GAAP; actuarial smoothing has little
marginal impact. Turning to the firm, a comparison of Panels B1 and B2 indicates that the expected
IRR is higher with than without the actuary (for reasonable bond allocations25). Also, as before,
insurer profitability is higher under US GAAP than NAIC for realistic bond exposures. Hence again
there is a tension between the policyholder’s preferred valuation method and that favored by the
insurer.
Figure 6 illustrates how the key outcomes depend as a function of surplus fraction attributed
to annuitants (

). All results are based on the asset allocation and book value ratio that maximizes

the annuitant’s utility. The solid line depicts utility-equivalent FLA values (left axis), while the
dashed line (right axis) illustrates expected IRRs, as we vary

from 0.8 to 1.0 (around the 0.9 base

case above). First, and somewhat surprisingly, annuitant values are relatively insensitive to variations
in

. The reason is that attributing high values of the surplus to annuitants leaves the insurer unduly

exposed to capital market shocks; this in turn increases the chance that surplus allocations will be cut
to avoid insolvency, in which case the annuitants may end up with lower benefits. Second, the

25

For example, TIAA-CREF (2011, page 6) holds about 85% of its assets in fixed income calculated as
follows: bonds ($168B) plus mortgages and contract loans ($14.5B) plus cash ($0.6B) divided by total
admitted assets ($226B) less separate account assets ($16B).
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insurer’s expected IRR is much more responsive, dropping from 6 to 1.5 percent, as the portion of
surplus dedicated to the annuitant rises. In other words, for reasonable sharing rates and assuming
actuarial intervention, smoothing using mostly historical cost valuation is preferable to fair market
valuation.26
Figure 6 here
To summarize, this section confirms that accounting smoothing is appealing to the annuitant
and, for reasonable bond allocations, to the insurer as well. The insurer finds attractive high bond
exposures along with historical cost value accounting, as this combination helps stabilize returns and
reduce the cost of the guarantee issued to policyholders. Such a conservative investment and
valuation approach is also congruent with policyholder preferences, since annuitants favor stable
payout profiles. Adding actuarial smoothing techniques improves the insurer’s profitability and
solvency situation, given a realistic bond fraction and FMV accounting. Yet an approach that stresses
more fair market valuation such as OCI will be unattractive to the annuitant.

5 Conclusions
A participating payout annuity can be a very attractive mechanism to provide retirees a
guaranteed benefit plus some upside potential in the form of surplus sharing, while handling
systematic shocks to mortality tables, capital market uncertainty, and default risk. Our paper
develops a realistically-calibrated model of such a product to investigate how alternative accounting
and actuarial valuation techniques can influence policyholder welfare as well as insurer profitability
and stability. Our main contribution is to study how two different smoothing mechanisms shape
policyholder and insurer outcomes, to help illuminate the current public debate about whether to
push insurance companies to undertake fair market valuation. We show that smoothing reduces
volatility without subtracting the expected returns from holding equity; consequently, smoothing is
economically attractive to risk-averse annuitants and affordable for insurers. In this sense, smoothing
is not simply an illusion in the insurance context.

26

In results not detailed here, we also conclude that the preferred bond fraction is in the range of 0.6-0.7.
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Using a simple two-period illustrative model, we showed how PLA payout smoothing can
add value to both annuitant and insurer. Next, a more complex approach examined how insurers can
use accounting and actuarial techniques to smooth reporting with the goal of transferring surpluses
earned in good years to support benefit payouts in bad years. Nevertheless with such smoothing,
investors and policyholders are hard-pressed to perceive an insurer’s true financial status.
Accordingly, the practice has prompted calls for fair market valuation in insurance company’s
balance sheets. Yet this also introduces additional volatility which could undermine insurer
profitability and the appeal of retirement annuities.
Our findings should be of considerable current interest, since insurance company valuation
techniques have been charged in the press with being nontransparent and potentially conducive to
insurer instability. Moreover, international accounting standards are moving away from historical
cost accounting toward a fair value approach, requiring that companies report both liabilities and
assets at market values. While this movement will enhance reporting to those seeking to buy
insurance company shares, curtailing smoothing also threatens policyholders seeking the protection
associated with long-term retirement payout products.
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Appendix A: Proof of Equations (2) and (3)
The CRRA lifetime utility function describing the annuitant´s preferences is given by
∙

∙

1

.

1

(A1)

where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is , the rate of time preference is , the probability of
2

survival to

1 of

1 , and the expectation

0 under the subjective

at time

at time

probability measure . The realization and the probability of the consumption
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measures the subjective probability for an increase (decrease). Next we
and replace the expected consumption by its realization and probability:
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Calculating the derivative of
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and setting it equal to zero gives us:

1

1

⋅

⋅ 1
1

⋅

1

1

⋅ 1
⋅

0

⋅

0

(A6)
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1

⋅

1

0

⋅

⋅
Solving for the smoothing factor

⋅

yields:

(A7)

The value

of the PLA for the insurer is given by:
N 1

VI

p S ⋅ q ⋅u
1 i

1

q

⋅d

⋅ y,

(A8)

with the risk-neutral probability of an upward jump and the riskless interest rate .
and 1
are positive variables. Consequently, the value of the insurer is a linear function of the smoothing
parameter if:
⋅
Replacing

with its definition

1

⋅

1

or

/

.

gives us the following result:

1

(A10)

0:

We rearrange terms and assume
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(A9)
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by definition, finally we can solve for :
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(A12)
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Appendix B: Capital Market and Mortality Model
The portfolio of our life insurance company includes a stock and a bond fund. The stochastic
dynamics of the bond fund are modeled using a multi-factor CIR model of the term structure as
is the sum of independent
described in Chen and Scott (1993). In this model, the short rate
state variables:
(B1)

Each of the state variables followings a CIR-type square root diffusion process:
–

⋅

,

(B2)

0, if

where
,
, and
are positive constants and
independent Wiener processes.

.

are

The term structure of interest rates has an affine structure and is described by:
log

,

,

where

represents the -period spot rate at time , and

are given by

(B4)
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1

2
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1
2
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/
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Α

(B3)

,

2
.

are constants.

We assume that the insurer holds a bond fund with target duration
that is re-adjusted at the
beginning of each period to maintain that target value. The price of one unit of the bond fund
evolves according to:
⋅

with
by:

,

1
1

,
1,

1

,

,

(B5)

being the spot rates from equation (A3). The bond fund pays annual coupons

⋅

,

In addition to the bond fund, the insurer invests in stocks, with prices
∙

given

∙

evolving according to:
.

(B7)
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Here,
is again the short rate, and
is the stochastic risk premium (net of
and
and a standard Wiener process
non-stochastic dividends) with constants
based on a fixed dividend yield
:
uncorrelated to , . Stocks pay an annual dividend
∙

1 ,

(B8)

To calibrate the term structure model, we rely on historical data on US 3-month T-bills rates and US
Treasury zero yields with maturities of 1 to 10 years over the period January 1988 to December
3, as the a 3-factor CIR model provide the best fit to the data when compared to
2012.27 We set
alternative parsimonious multi-factor specifications. Based on this data and model specification, the
calibration approach presented in Chen and Scott (1993) produced the following parameter estimates
(see Table B1), with r , the initial factor value derived from the current term structure:
Table B1: Estimates of 3-factor CIR Model
,

1
2
3

0.0092
0.0014
0.0122

0.2576
0.3035
0.3108

0.0851
0.0708
0.1427

-0.2036
-0.5642
0.0655

0.0000
0.0009
0.0188

Note: Estimates of the 3-factor CIR model based on data provided by
Datastream. Source: Authors´ calculation.

Stock price developments and dividend rates are calibrated to the S&P 500 Price Index and the S&P
500 Dividend Yield Index over the same period (December 1981 to December 2012). This produces
the following parameter estimates:

= 3.28%,

= 16.5%, and

= 2.6%. The insurer’s asset

allocation follows a constant mix strategy: the portfolio is rebalanced annually toward the targeted
allocation when assets are sold to pay benefits to the annuitants. In case the stock exposure exceeds
the target exposure, the insurance company sells a higher percentage of stocks to pay the benefits.
When we use the calibration parameters of the asset model described above, we use the risk and
return profiles of the asset model reported in Table B2:
Table B2: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Capital Market Model

Expectation (%)
Standard Deviation (%)

2.30
11.67

4.21
1.66

7.89
18.10

2.63
-

1
0.4498
0.0300
0

0
1
0.0865
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
0
1

Correlation

Note: Mean, standard deviation and correlation of bond fund , cupon , stocks
dividends . Number of simulations = 10.000, Source: Authors` calculation.

27

, and

Specifically, we use the following Datastream time series: FRTCM3M, FRTNY01, FRTNY02, FRTNY03,
FRTNY04, FRTNY05, FRTNY06, FRTNY07, FRTNY08, FRTNY09, FRTNY10.
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Following Cairns, Blake and Dowd (CBD, 2006), the stochastic dynamics of the annuitants’ actual
mortality rates
≔
, at age and time are described by:
ln

where

,

,

1

,

Κ

̅ ⋅Κ

are the single year death probabilities, Κ 1 and Κ

2

(B9)

are period mortality indexes and

is

the average age over the considered age range. To estimate future mortality rates, the period
mortality indexes component Κ 1 and Κ 2 are forecasted using a bivariate random walk with drift:
Κ

Κ

Σ⋅

.

(B10)

and Κ are constant vectors, Σ is an upper triangular 2x2 matrix, and
Here,
standard normal random vector.

is 2-dimensional

We calibrate the CBD model to US mortality data from the Human Mortality Database.28 This
produces the parameter estimates reported in Table B3:
Table B3: Calibration of CBD Mortality Model
Σ

Κ
1

-10.9033

-0.0400

0.0719

2

0.1011

0.0004

- 0.0010

0
0.0003

Note: Estimated parameters of the CBD mortality model based
on US mortality data for the human mortality database. Κ the
estimated mortality, correlation
period mortality index,
matix Source: Authors´ calculation.

28

Specifically we use the U.S. Death Rates (Period 1x1), Males and Females, Last modified: 16-Nov-2012,
Version MPv5 for the period 1933-2010. See http://www.mortality.org.
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Figure 1: Stylized Model of Participating Life Annuity with Payout Smoothing
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Notes: Evolution of Fund Unit (FU) prices, annuity benefits, and insurer reserves over two periods if smoothing is applied.
The number of individuals, , the smoothing factor , the two-year survival probability , the initial price of the FU
, and
the FU prices in the following periods , S , S , S , S and
, with
⋅ ⋅ . Source: Authors´ illustration; see
text.

Figure 2: Threshold Subjective Probability of Downward Jumps Necessary to Value Smoothing
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Notes: Participating Life Annuity (PLA) policyholder’s subjective probability ∗ for a capital
market downturn beyond which PLA payout smoothing is utility increasing for alternative
levels of relative risk aversion ( ). Calibration: time preference rate:
0.96, 2-period
survival probability:
0.8. Capital markets: Fund unit (FU) price may increase (decrease)
by a proportional factor of
1/ . Source: Authors´ calculations; see text.
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Figure 3: Effect of Asset Allocation versus Valuation Method on PLA Policyholder Utility
Panel A: Accounting Smoothing
A1: FMV vs. HCV

A2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method
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Panel B: Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing
B1: FMV vs. HCV

B2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method
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Notes: Utility equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA; in $000) that generates the same utility as a Participating Lifetime Annuity
(PLA) with a guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 for alternative scenarios based on a time-additive CRRA
utility function. HCV = Historical Cost Valuation, FMV = Fair Market Valuation. Calibration accounting smoothing, male
age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference:
0.96; relative risk aversion:
5; GIR: 3%;
mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to
annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency
reserve 0%. Calibration accounting and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Figure 4: Effect of Asset Allocation versus Valuation Method on Insurer Profitability and Stability for a PLA Product
Panel A: Accounting Smoothing
A1: FMV vs. HCV

A2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method

A3: Shortfall Probability of Corner Cases over Time
50
Shortfall Probability (%)

Expected IRR (%)

5
0
-5
-10
-15

100%Bonds / FMV
100%Stocks / FMV

30
20
10

HCV
FMV

-20
0

100%Bonds / HCV
100%Stocks / HCV

40

0.2

0.4
0.6
Bond Percentage

0.8

0
1

0

5

10

15

20 25
Year

30

35

40

45

Panel B: Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing
B1: FMV vs. HCV

B2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method

B3: Shortfall Probability of Corner Cases over Time
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Notes: Expected internal rate of return (IRR) and shortfall probability of a Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 for alternative scenarios.
HCV = historical cost valuation, FMV = fair market valuation. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference:
0.96; relative
risk aversion:
5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%;
solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency reserve 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%.
Source: Authors` calculations.
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Figure 5: Effect of Alternative Valuation Methods on PLA Policyholder and Insurer Outcomes
Panel A: Accounting Smoothing
A1: Annuitants´ Perspective

A2: Insurers´ Perspective
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Notes: Figure A1 and B1 show the utility equivalent fixed life annuity (in $000) that generates the same utility as a
Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with a guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 based on a time-additive
CRRA utility function for alternative valuation scenarios. Figure A2 and B2 show the expected internal rate of return
(IRR). OCI = other comprehensive income valuation, HCV = historical cost valuation, FMV = fair market valuation, US
GAAP Default = bond valuation OCI and stock valuation FMV, NAIC Default = bond valuation HCV and stock valuation
FMV. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference:
0.96; relative risk aversion:
5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds
fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial
contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency reserve 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency
reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. Source: Authors` calculations; see text.
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Figure 6: Impact of Surplus Sharing and Actuarial Smoothing on Key Outcomes
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Notes: Optimal utility equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA; in $000) that generates the same utility as a Participating
Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with a guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 based on a time-additive CRRA
utility function, corresponding internal rate of return for alternative annuitant participation rates. HCV = historical cost
valuation. Calibration, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference:
0.96; relative
risk aversion:
5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds fund duration: 10
years; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%.
Source: Authors` calculations; see text.
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Table 1: Stylized Two Period Model of Participating Life Annuity(PLA) with Smoothing
Annuitants’ Optimal
Smoothing Factor
(in %)
0.2

0.5

Welfare Gains from
Optimal Smoothing
(in %)
0.2

0.5

Insurers’ Gains from
Optimal Smoothing
(in %)
0.2

0.5

Low Volatility Capital Market Scenario (
0
9.1
2
0.7
14.5
5
11.9
16.3
10

1.2)
0
0.01
3.6

0.8
4.9
9.9

0
0.1
1.1

0.8
1.3
1.5

High Volatility Capital Market Scenario
0
13.0
2
13.1
20.7
5
18.1
23.2
10

1.3
0
0.3
10.0

1.7
9.5
16.8

0
1.7
2.4

1.7
2.7
3.0

Notes: Annuitants’ utility-maximizing smoothing factor
(in %), corresponding welfare gains for
annuitants (percentage increase in certainty equivalent fixed life annuity), and corresponding gain for the
insurer (in % of the PLA premium). Calibration, time preference:
0.96, 2-period survival probability:
0.8.
represents the annuitant’s subjective probability of a capital market downturn, represents the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Capital markets: Fund unit (FU) price may increase (decrease) by a
proportional factor of
1/ . Source: Authors´ calculation; see text.
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Table 2: Utility-Maximizing Asset Allocation and Valuation Methods
for PLA Policyholder Having Alternative Levels of Risk Aversion

Accounting Smoothing
Relative Risk Aversion

Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing

Bond
HCV Optimal Utility
Percentage Ratio Equivalent FLA

Low /
2
Medium /
5
High /
10

0
40
80

80
80
100

15,533
12,881
11,783

Bond
Percentage
10
60
80

HCV
Ratio
70
70
70

Optimal Utility
Equivalent FLA
14,159
12,283
11,469

Notes: Optimal utility equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA; in $) with respective asset allocation percentage and book value
ratio for alternative calibrations of the time-additive CRRA utility function. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65
in 2013; initial guaranteed Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) benefits: $10,000; time preference:
0.96; relative risk
aversion: low (
2), medium (
5), high (
10); GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value
$163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency
limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency reserve: 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial
contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. Source: Authors` calculations; see text.

Table 3: Impacts of Optimal Combination of Asset Allocation and Valuation Method on
Internal Rates of Return and Shortfall Probabilities, PLA Policyholder Having Alternative
Levels of Risk Aversion

Relative Risk
Aversion

Bond
Percentage

HCV
Ratio

(in %)

Shortfall
Probability (in %)

Accounting Smoothing

Low /
2
Medium /
5
High /
10

0
40
80

80
80
100

6.20
3.61
4.97

6.96
1.58
0.00

Asset and Actuarial Smoothing

Low /
2
Medium /
5
High /
10

10
60
80

70
70
70

6.60
4.85
4.67

8.24
0.75
0.15

Notes: Expectation of internal rate of return and shortfall probability in percent for the optimal utility-equivalent fixed life
annuity for alternative scenarios. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed Participating
Lifetime Annuity (PLA) benefits: $10,000; time preference:
0.96; relative risk aversion: low (
2 , medium
5 , high
10 ; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bond fund duration: 10
years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve:
5%; target contingency reserve: 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency reserve: 5%; target
contingency reserve 10%. Source: Authors` calculations; see text.

